Hard Problem of Past Lives & Afterlife

The unsolvable chain of evidence. For a past life memory to be verified, you'd need a documented fact from a deceased person's life that the current person could not possibly know through normal means, and you'd have to rule out fraud, cryptomnesia (hidden memory), and genetic or collective unconscious transmission. For the afterlife, you'd need a verifiable, two-way communication with a specific, identifiable deceased consciousness. The hard problem is that any piece of evidence (e.g., a child knowing a dead person's secret) can be explained by lesser hypotheses (telepathy between living minds, chance, subconscious inference). The signal can never be isolated from the noise of unknown psychic phenomena or pure coincidence.

*Example: A child recalls being a pilot named James who died in a WWII crash, giving specific coordinates. Investigators find wreckage there of a plane piloted by a James. The hard problem: This is astonishing, but is it proof of reincarnation? Alternative explanations include: 1) The child psychically tapped into the collective memory/historical record of the event (clairvoyance, not past life). 2) Extreme coincidence plus confabulation. To prove a past life, you must first disprove all forms of present-life psychic ability, which is itself unproven. The conclusion is always one unproven assumption stacked on another.* Hard Problem of Past Lives & Afterlife.

by Nammugal January 24, 2026

Hard Problem of the Demarcation Problem

The meta-problem: There is no agreed-upon rule to distinguish science from non-science, and the very search for such a rule may be unscientific. Falsifiability (Popper) fails—string theory isn't easily falsifiable but is considered science. Astrology makes falsifiable claims but is pseudoscience. Methodological naturalism? It rules out theology but also historical sciences that reconstruct unique past events. The hard problem is that "science" is a family-resemblance concept, not a neat category. Any bright-line rule you propose either excludes legitimate sciences or lets in obvious pseudoscience, revealing that demarcation is a social and philosophical negotiation, not a logical one.

Example: Is evolutionary biology science? It reconstructs unique past events (unfalsifiable in a strict lab sense). Yet it's a core science. Is phrenology pseudoscience? It used measurement and data (the "scientific method" of its day). The hard problem: We know the difference intuitively, but can't define it without circular logic ("It's science because scientists do it"). The demarcation criteria are like trying to nail jelly to a wall—the harder you try, the messier it gets, and you're left wondering why you're nailing jelly in the first place. Hard Problem of the Demarcation Problem.

by Nammugal January 24, 2026

Hard Problem of the Demarcation Problem

The prediction problem. Unlike in physics, where you can isolate variables and predict an eclipse to the second, social sciences (economics, political science, sociology) deal with complex, reflexive systems. Humans react to predictions, changing the outcome (the "Lucas Critique"). The hard problem is: Can you have a real science of human society if its core subjects alter their behavior upon hearing your findings? True scientific laws are supposed to be invariant. Social "laws" are more like trends that expire once people know about them, making the field perpetually one step behind a moving target.

Example: An economist develops a perfect model predicting stock market crashes. Once published, investors see it and adjust their behavior to avoid the predicted conditions, thereby preventing the very crash the model forecasted. The model is now wrong. The hard problem: The act of studying the system changes it. This makes falsification—the bedrock of science—incredibly tricky. Social science thus often ends up explaining the past very well (postdiction) but failing at predicting the future, which is what we usually want from a science. Hard Problem of the Demarcation Problem.

by Nammugal January 24, 2026

Hard Problem of Science & Pseudoscience

The problem of motivation, not method. Both can use data, jargon, and peer review (see creation "science"). The core difference might be the attitude toward evidence: science seeks to test and potentially disprove its ideas; pseudoscience seeks to defend a preordained conclusion. The hard problem is that this is a psychological distinction about the practitioners, not a methodological one. You can't look at a paper and always tell. A bad scientist (cherry-picking data) is using pseudoscientific tactics, while a clever pseudoscientist can mimic the form of science perfectly. The line is blurred because it's about internal intent, which is invisible.

Example: Flat Earthers run experiments (lasers over water) they claim prove no curvature. Scientists point out flawed methodology. The Flat Earthers dismiss it as part of the conspiracy. The hard problem: Their process looks scientific—hypothesis, test, observation. The breakdown is their refusal to accept counter-evidence as valid. But who decides what "valid" counter-evidence is? The scientific community. So, in practice, science is defined by social consensus of what counts as proper evidence, not by a pure, objective rulebook. Pseudoscience is simply what that consensus excludes. Hard Problem of Science & Pseudoscience.

by Nammugal January 24, 2026

Hard Problem of Epistemology

The problem of the criterion. To know which things we know (a theory of knowledge), we need a reliable method. But to justify that method, we need to know it leads to truth. This is a vicious circle: we need a method to identify knowledge, but we need knowledge to validate the method. Every foundational theory (empiricism, rationalism) starts with an unproven assumption. The hard problem is that epistemology, the study of knowledge, cannot get started without presupposing the very thing it seeks to justify. We are like a person searching for their glasses while needing their glasses to see.

Example: "I know the sun will rise tomorrow based on induction (past experience)." The epistemologist asks: "How do you know induction is reliable?" You might say, "It's always worked before." But that's using induction to justify induction—circular reasoning. Any other justification (e.g., it's logically necessary) would require its own justification. The hard problem: We clearly have functional knowledge, but we cannot construct a watertight, non-circular, non-arbitrary account of how we have it. Epistemology either ends in infinite regress, circularity, or an arbitrary stopping point ("just trust your senses, bro"). Hard Problem of Epistemology.

by Nammugal January 24, 2026

Hard Problem of Science

The fundamental paradox that science is a human activity, subject to all our cognitive biases, social pressures, and cultural blind spots, yet it claims to produce objective, universal knowledge about a reality independent of humans. The hard problem is explaining how a process so deeply embedded in flawed human psychology and sociology can successfully "escape" to reveal truths that transcend those very conditions. How does a system built on tentative, peer-reviewed consensus, funding battles, and paradigm shifts manage to land rovers on Mars? The gap between the messy, subjective process and the astounding, objective results is the core mystery.

Example: Two scientists from rival labs, one funded by a corporation, the other by a government grant, both deeply ambitious and prone to confirmation bias, run the same experiment on a new drug. Through a process of mutual criticism, replication attempts, statistical scrutiny, and raw competition, their flawed human efforts converge on a reliable, reproducible result about molecular interactions. The hard problem: How did the truth emerge from that morass of ego and institutional noise? It’s like a hundred painters, all colorblind and trying to sabotage each other’s canvases, somehow collectively producing a photographically perfect landscape. Hard Problem of Science.

by Enkigal January 24, 2026

Hard Problem of the Scientific Method

The problem of its own foundation. The scientific method relies on observation, induction, and logical inference. But you cannot use the scientific method to prove the scientific method works without begging the question (using the tool to validate itself). Why trust induction? "Because it's worked before" is itself an inductive argument. Why trust logic or our senses? The method rests on philosophical assumptions (the uniformity of nature, the reliability of reason) that are necessarily taken on faith for the game to begin. The hard problem is that our ultimate tool for knowing has no non-circular justification.

Example: You drop an apple 10,000 times. It falls. You induce the law of gravity. The hard problem: What justifies the leap from "it happened every time I looked" to "it will always happen"? Nothing in logic or experience can prove the future will resemble the past. We just assume it will. The entire scientific edifice is built on this unsupported leap of faith, this "inference to the best explanation." It works spectacularly, but we cannot scientifically prove why it works without already assuming it does. It’s the ultimate bootstrap operation. Hard Problem of the Scientific Method.

by Enkigal January 24, 2026