Hard Problem of Psychosis

The fundamental challenge of bridging the experiential divide between the psychotic and non-psychotic mind. It's not just about treating symptoms, but about the near-impossibility of an outsider truly understanding the subjective reality of psychosis—where hallucinations have the sensory force of truth, and delusions form a coherent, alternative worldview. The hard problem is epistemological: How can therapeutic or medical models claim authority over an internal experience they cannot fully access or validate? This raises ethical questions about coercion ("forcing" someone back to a consensus reality) and the nature of reality itself.

Example: A man believes a government satellite is broadcasting thoughts into his head. Medication silences the "voice," but to him, the cure feels like the authorities successfully "jammed his receiver." The psychiatrist sees a treated illness. The patient sees a confirmed conspiracy. The hard problem: There is no neutral ground to adjudicate these realities. All therapy is, from one perspective, the imposition of one reality map (neurotypical, consensual) over another (psychotic). This makes "recovery" a deeply philosophical, not just clinical, process of navigating incompatible worlds. Hard Problem of Psychosis.

by Dumuabzu January 25, 2026

Hard Money Whore

A prostitute who is paid so little for services, she accepts coins rather than paper money.

Alternatively, a prostitute one views so lowly you would only pay her in coins.

That hard money whore on River street charges a quarter for an hour, so I gave her two dimes and a nickel.

by Pipiofftherails January 29, 2026

Hard Problem of Cognition

The head-scratcher of how mere meat—a biological computer made of soggy neurons—can actually process information, learn, and solve problems in a way that feels like genuine understanding. It's not about behavior (a robot can mimic problem-solving), but about the inner "click" of comprehension. How does the physical firing of synapses translate into the mental model of a concept, the "Aha!" moment, or the ability to apply knowledge in novel ways? It's the bridge between neurological mechanics and the intangible phenomenon of knowing, questioning whether cognition is just complex computation or something more.

*Example: "We trained the AI to diagnose diseases better than any doctor, but the hard problem of cognition hits when we ask how it knows. It can't explain the intuition, the weighing of nuances. It just outputs answers. Is that true cognition, or just an advanced magic 8-ball made of math?"*

by Abzugal January 30, 2026

Hard Problem of Consciousness

The granddaddy of metaphysical puzzles, famously framed by David Chalmers. It asks: Why and how does the objective, electrical and chemical sausage-making of the brain produce subjective experience—the redness of red, the pain of a stubbed toe, the feeling of being you? It's the gap between explaining all the functions of awareness (the "easy problems") and explaining why those functions are accompanied by an inner movie at all. Solving it would be the difference between building a perfect robot that acts conscious and creating one that actually feels like it's inside.

Example: "They mapped my connectome and simulated my brain in a supercomputer. The digital 'me' posts on social media just like I would. But the hard problem of consciousness is this: Is there a ghost in that machine? Or is it just a philosophical zombie, perfectly mimicking a soul it doesn't have?" Hard Problem of Consciousness

by Abzugal January 30, 2026

Hard Problem of Intelligence

The dilemma of defining and locating the "smoke" of genuine smarts. We can measure performance (IQ, skills, adaptability), but can't pinpoint the fundamental "fire" that produces it. Is intelligence a single, general thing (the g factor), or a bag of tricks? Can it exist without consciousness? If we create an AI that outperforms humans in every task, have we created intelligence, or just an elaborate, hollow simulation? It's the problem of separating the appearance of smart behavior from the elusive, essential quality of understanding that presumably underlies it.

Example: "The chess computer beat the grandmaster, but faced with a collapsed aisle in a grocery store, it's useless. The hard problem of intelligence is figuring out if true smarts is that narrow excellence, or the general, common-sense adaptability to navigate a messy world that the computer utterly lacks." Hard Problem of Intelligence

by Abzugal January 30, 2026

Hard Problem of Plant Cognition

The debate over whether plants' complex adaptive behaviors—like root networks solving resource distribution puzzles or leaves optimizing sunlight capture—count as a form of "thinking." The hard problem here is: If they have no neurons, where and what is the "cognitive workspace"? How do we recognize cognition in a system so alien, operating on a timescale of hours or days, without a central processor? It's the challenge of defining cognition so it isn't just "brain-based information processing," potentially forcing us to see intelligence in silent, slow-motion biological algorithms.

Example: "The vine grew a perfect path through the lattice, avoiding painted (toxic) sections. The hard problem of plant cognition: Was that a cognitive choice, a simple chemical tropism, or a beautiful, mindless computation? And if there's no difference in outcome, does the 'mind' part even matter?"

by Abzugal January 30, 2026

Hard Problem of Plant Consciousness

The most speculative leap: the question of whether plants, with their integrated signaling and responsive behaviors, could have any form of subjective experience. Not thinking, but feeling—even if it's a slow, diffuse sensation of light, damage, or attraction. With no brain or nervous system, what would consciousness even be made of? It’s the ultimate challenge to our animal-centric view of sentience, pushing the boundaries of whether consciousness is a universal property of complex, self-sustaining systems or a unique trick of neural circuitry.

Example: "The mystic says the forest has a spirit. The scientist says it's a chemical network. The hard problem of plant consciousness is the unsettling void between: what if they're both right? What if that 'spirit' is a real, subjective experience, but one so alien and slow we could never recognize, let alone measure, it?"

by Abzugal January 30, 2026